Strategic interactions form the basis for evolutionary game theory and often occur in dynamic environments. The various strategies employed in a population may alter the quality or state of the environment, which may in turn feedback to change the incentive structure of strategic interactions. This type of feedback is common in social-ecological systems, evolutionary-ecological systems, and even psychological-economic systemswhere the state of the environment alters the dynamics of competing types, and vice versa. Here we develop a framework of "eco-evolutionary game theory" that permits the study of joint strategic and environmental dynamics, with feedbacks. We consider environments governed either by a renewable resource (e.g. common-pool harvesting) or a decaying resource (e.g. pollution byproducts). We show that the dynamics of strategies and the environment depend, crucially, on the incentives for individuals to lead or follow behavioral changes, and on the relative speed of environmental versus strategic change. Our analysis unites dynamical phenomena that occur in settings as diverse as human decision-making, plant nutrient acquisition, and resource harvesting. We discuss the implication of our results for fields ranging from ecology to economics.
Eco-evolutionary games
Now, using the payoff matrix from equation 4 we can write our eco-evolutionary system 126 as 127ẋ = x(1 − x)(π L (x, n) − π H (x, n)) ,
where x is the fraction of the population that plays the strategy with low emissions (strategy 139 L), (1 − x) is the fraction the plays the high emission strategy and α is the decay rate of the 140 resource stock. We can again define n, bounded between 0 and 1, as a linear transformation 141 of m (see supplementary information section S2.1), yielding dynamics governed by 142ṅ = α(x − n).
Although decaying versus renewing resources arise in different biological or social con-143 texts, they both yield the same qualitative results and the following analysis of dynamical 144 outcomes applies to both cases. 145 Incentives for behavioral change 146 The dynamics of the eco-evolutionary system above can be understood in terms of four 147 parameter combinations, which have an intuitive interpretations as incentives to change 148 behavior:
149 ∆ 1 L = π H (1, 1) − π L (1, 1) = T 1 − R 1 ∆ 1 H = π H (0, 1) − π L (0, 1) = P 1 − S 1 δ 0 L = π L (1, 0) − π H (1, 0) = R 0 − T 0 δ 0 H = π L (0, 0) − π H (0, 0) = S 0 − P 0 .
These four parameters will allow us express dynamical outcomes in terms of the incentive to 150 lead or follow strategy change under either a rich or a poor environmental state (Figure 1 ).
151
The parameter ∆ 1 L quantifies the incentive to switch to the strategy with high envi-152 ronmental impact (denoted by ∆) given that all other individuals follow the low-impact 153 strategy (denoted by the L subscript) and the system is currently in a rich environmental 154 6 Figure 1 : A graphical representation of how incentive parameters in eco-evolutionary games influence dynamics. The horizontal axis of the state space corresponds to the frequency of individuals using the strategy with low impact on the environment, whereas the vertical axis indicates the quality of the environment, n, with the dashed line representing the attracting environmental nullcline. Each of the four incentive parameters (δ's and ∆'s) control the direction and magnitude of strategy dynamics at a corner of the state space: strategy dynamics follow the red arrows when the corresponding δ or ∆ is positive, and blue arrows when negative. When all are positive, meaning there are incentives to lead and to follow strategic changes, then some form of cyclical dynamics seem plausible. However, we show that all δ's and ∆'s being positive is neither necessary nor sufficient for cyclic dynamics in eco-evolutionary games. 7 state (denoted by the superscript 1). In the context of socio-ecological systems, ∆ 1 L can be 155 interpreted as the incentive to lead a "gold rush" -that is, be the first player to switch 156 to a high-impact strategy and reap the rewards of an abundant resource. By contrast, the population, denoted by (x * + , n * + ) and (x * − , n * − ). The equilibrium (x * , n * ) = (0, 0) is stable only 174 if δ 0 H < 0, which is intuitively clear from figure 1. Similarly, the equilibrium (x * , n * ) = (1, 1) 175 is stable only if ∆ 1 L < 0. The equilibrium at x * + is always a saddle, and thus never stable. 176 Whereas the equilibrium x * − can be either stable or unstable. 177 we only find persistent cycles in the eco-evolutionary system when the interior equilibrium 178 x * − is unstable. Conditions for this equilibrium to be unstable first require
and 180 ∆ 1
Instability of x * − also requires
where is the speed of environmental feedback relative to speed of strategy updating. The 182 value of crit can be expressed analytically in terms of the parameters of the system, and it 183 differs slightly for renewing versus decaying resource feedbacks (See Supplementary informa-184 8 tion, sections S1.1 and S2.1).
Dynamical regimes 186
Strategy-environment dynamics exhibit several different qualitative regimes, depending on 187 the incentives to switch strategies (δ's and ∆'s) and on the timescale separation, , between 188 strategy evolution and environmental impacts. 189 When there is no incentive to lead either the environmental movement or the gold rush 190 (∆ 1 L , δ 0 H < 0), as in Figure 2a , then both edge equilibria are stable, and only the saddle 191 equilibrium falls within the state space. This means that the dynamics in this regime will 192 exhibit bistability -with attraction to a population composed entirely of one or another 193 strategy, depending upon the initial conditions. This result is intuitive because, in this 194 regime, there is no incentive for individuals to be leaders of change in either the low-quality 195 or high-quality environmental state. Therefore the system will eventually be dominated by 196 one or the other strategic type, with the corresponding environmental equilibrium. also positive and stronger, in aggregate, than the incentives to lead change. Furthermore, 203 cycles also require that the environmental feedback is sufficiently slow compared to strategy 204 evolution ( Figure 3 ). In sum, when there are positive incentives to lead both movements, a 205 stable limit cycle will occur when ∆ 1 H > 0, δ 0 L > 0, ∆ 1 H δ 0 L > ∆ 1 L δ 0 H , and < crit . We find no 206 evidence of cycles outside this region (See SI S3).
207
When there are positive incentives to lead the environmental movement but not to lead Each panel shows the dynamical outcomes for fixed values of incentives ∆ 1 L and δ 0 H . Yellow regions denote parameter regimes that can produce limit cycles, provided < crit , with level curves of crit shown as black lines. Blue regions represent regions with a single dynamical outcome. Green regions represent bistability. In panels (c) and (d) the yellow regions can exhibit bistability, dominance by one strategy, or cycles that occur in a bistable regime; the value of determines which of these outcomes occur. Supplementary Information section S1.2 provides analytical expressions for the boundaries between these dynamical regimes, in terms of the incentive Figure 3 : Phase planes and temporal dynamics in eco-evolutionary games with a decaying resource. Parameters are chosen to fall in the yellow region of figure 2(b). Only the speed of environmental dynamics relative to strategy dynamics, , varies between the panels. Convergence either to an interior equilibrium or to a limit cycle is determined by . Figure 4: Simulations of eco-evolutionary game dynamics from the regime with possible cycles in figure 2(c). In each panel, the color of the solution curves illustrate the basins of attraction of the system. Green curves approach the state dominated by the low impact strategy and blue curves represent regions that approach the interior equilibrium or a stable limit cycle. Panel (a) shows the dynamics with fast environmental feedbacks, and thus the interior equilibrium is stable, and has a large basin of attraction. Panels (b) and (c) illustrate cases with environmental dynamics of intermediate speed which exhibit bistability between the low-impact dominated state and limit cycles in the interior of the phase space. Panel (d) displays dynamics under slow environmental feedbacks. When feedback speed crosses a critical threshold, limit cycles are no longer possible, and the entire phase space approaches the corner equilibrium.
3.1 Co-evolution of the environment and decision-making motivate their study by noting that controlled decision making is likely to be costly but will 258 allow individuals to choose optimal behavior. Further, they assume that when a population is 259 dominated by controlled agents, then the fitness difference between optimal and suboptimal 260 decisions will decrease because institutions or public goods created by controlled agents will 261 stabilize the environment. This then favors automated agents who choose an option quickly 262 without paying the cost of controlled processing. Rand et al. (2017) introduce a parameter 263 that makes the cost of control frequency-dependent, so that when control agents are rare, it 264 is more costly for them to ensure a stable environment. 
Grass-legume competition 276
Evo-evolutionary games provide a natural framework for studying competition between 277 grasses and legumes. Many legumes form symbioses with nitrogen-fixing bacteria, allow-278 ing them to thrive in nitrogen-limited environments. Through time, however, some of the 279 fixed nitrogen becomes available in the soil to nearby plants. In effect, the plant strategy of 280 nitrogen fixation both frees plants from nitrogen limitation, and it generates an environmen-281 tal feedback that increases the availability of nitrogen in the soil. Grasses, on the other hand, 282 do not fix nitrogen. Competition between obligately nitrogen-fixing legumes and grasses can 283 14 be modeled as a special case of our decaying resource framework. Here the environmental state corresponds to the degree that nitrogen is limiting, and the two strategies correspond 285 to the species present in the system. We can thus write the relative abundance of grasses 286 (the low nitrogen emission strategy) as x and legumes (the high nitrogen emissions strategy) 287 as 1 − x. 288 We can determine the qualitative dynamics that will arise in grass-legume competition, 289 based on the δ and ∆ parameters and the relative timescale of environmental versus strategy 290 dynamics, .
291
First, consider the grass-dominated state, with nitrogen limitation at its greatest (n = 1).
292
In this state, we expect legumes to be able to invade because of the advantage of nitrogen 293 fixation in a low-nitrogen environment. Thus we expect ∆ 1 H > 0. Similarly, we expect 294 δ 0 H > 0 because in an environment where nitrogen is not limiting (n = 0) that is dominated 295 by nitrogen fixing legumes, non-fixing grasses will be able to invade since they do not pay 296 the cost of nitrogen fixation, but can reap the benefit of a nutrient-rich environment.
297
And so we know that the dynamics will fall somewhere in figure 2 b. Legumes are likely 298 to have a competitive advantage in a low nitrogen environment regardless of their relative 299 abundance, thus we expect ∆ 1 H > 0. The same holds for grasses, given nitrogen is not 300 limiting, so that δ 0 L > 0. Finally, in species competition, it is typically more difficult for the 301 first individual to successfully invade and establish than it is for an established species to 302 spread and increase in abundance (Tilman, 2004) . This implies that we expect ∆ 1 L < ∆ 1 H 303 and δ 0 H < δ 0 L .
304
Because ∆ 1 L δ 0 H < ∆ 1 H δ 0 L holds we expect grass-legume systems to be susceptible to cyclic 305 dynamics. However, cyclic dynamics still require that the timescale of the feedback between 306 the abundance of legumes and nitrogen availability is sufficiently slow. This too is reasonable 307 in nature, because nitrogen is a valuable resource and a legume will tend to limit the rate at 308 which fixed nitrogen leaks into the environment. which forms the basis for bioeconomics (Clark, 1990) . Eco-evolutionary game theory provides 321 a natural framework to situate common-pool resource models -because strategic interactions 322 depend upon, and conversely influence, the abundance of the common-pool resource.
323
It seems plausible that even the simplest form of common-pool resource harvesting will 324 lead to cyclic dynamics: as the biomass of resource stock collapses and overshoots, har-325 vesters respond by reducing effort, until the resource rebounds and high-effort strategies are 326 again profitable. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that such cycles will never occur without 327 additional complications. We formulate common-pool resource dynamics by assuming indi-328 viduals can harvest with either high, e H , or low, e L , effort. We let the evolutionary process 329 on strategy frequencies be governed by a profit function,
that maps the resource level and harvest effort into fitness. As in the general renewable 331 resource model, we assume that η is governed by logistic growth, and that the harvest rate 332 is proportional to η and effort (e L , e H ). Since π(e i , η) is linear, this model is a special case 333 of the renewable resource model we have exhaustively analyzed.
334
Transforming the resource level into a normalized environmental metric, we can construct 
342
And so the only possible outcome of this common-pool system is a stable mix of low-and 343 high-impact strategists (see Supplementary Information section S5 for detailed analysis and 344 for other possible scenarios). However, since the system falls on the boundary of a parameter 345 region that permits cycles, small changes to the system may induce cyclic dynamics. 346 We considered two extensions, introducing market pricing (where p decreases as harvest incentive for being a follower of strategy change that can cause cycles.
357
Harvest efficiency may depend on strategy frequency if each strategy requires specialized 358 skills and labor. As a strategy increases in frequency, increased opportunities for social 359 learning may lead to increased proficiency and efficiency gains (Henrich, 2004; Smolla and 360 Akcay, 2018). This effect alters both payoffs to individuals and the dynamics of the resource 361 (see supplementary information section S7 for analysis). As a result of these intertwined 362 consequences, we find instances of non-monotonicity -where increasing the growth rate of 363 the resource, for example, can first destabilize and then stabilize an interior equilibrium 364 (see supplementary information Figure S4 ). Despite this added complexity, the intuition 365 developed from our general framework still applies. In particular, our analysis of common-366 pool resource harvesting as a linear eco-evolution game showed that increasing the values of 367 either ∆ 1 H or δ 0 L could cause cycles, by moving the system into the yellow region in Figure   368 2b. Frequency-dependent harvest efficiency plays a similar role to increasing ∆ 1 H or δ 0 L , by 369 making it more profitable to switch to a high-frequency strategy due to increased efficiency, 370 and helps explain the cyclical dynamics that arise in this case (see supplementary information 371 section S7).
4 Discussion

373
We have developed a framework for studying linked environmental and evolutionary game 374 dynamics. Our analysis provides a systematic account of dynamical outcomes for an arbi-375 trary game with linear payoff structures, for environments that either intrinsically grow or 376 decay. This framework applies to any game-theoretic interaction where the strategies that 377 individuals employ impact the environment through time, and the state of the environment 378 influences the payoffs of the game. Such feedbacks are common in social-ecological systems, 379 evolutionary ecology, and even psychology.
380
Despite the broad relevance of eco-evolutionary games, the role of the environment on 381 strategic interactions has typically been considered only implicitly. And explicit account 382 of environmental feedbacks reveals added complexity and nuance (Estrela et al., 2018) . We 383 have shown that many prior studies of strategic interactions with environmental feedbacks are 384 special cases of our framework, with an explicit mapping to the parameters of our framework.
Perhaps the most striking result is that the rich dynamical outcomes that arise in eco- is that those authors consider an environment with no intrinsic tendency for growth or 392 decay. In many systems of ecological and social relevance the environmental variables that 393 affect payoffs have intrinsic dynamics, meaning that they regenerate (e.g., a population) 394 or decay (e.g., pollution) when left by themselves. Our analysis shows that the choice of 395 feedback structure has important consequences for system outcomes. Whereas Weitz et al.
396
(2016) find heteroclinic cycles independent of the timescale separation between environmental 397 and strategy dynamics, we find that the existence of limit cycles depends critically on the 398 degree of timescale separation. And so the qualitative outcomes of eco-evolutionary games 399 depend fundamentally on whether or not we account for the realistic intrinsic dynamics of 400 an environment.
401
We have also seen that coupling strategies and the environment can induce persistent 402 cycles even when neither the intrinsic environmental or intrinsic strategic dynamics exhibit 403 cycles on their own. However, it is well known that many ecological systems can produce single environmental factor that is subject to age-or stage-structured population dynamics.
407
In these cases, the complexity introduced via coupling with strategic interactions is likely to 408 be even more rich, with the potential for chaotic dynamics.
Supplementary Information
543 S1 Renewable resource model 544 We analyze a two-strategy evolutionary-game-theoretic model that incorporates environmen-545 tal feedbacks, governed by renewable resource dynamics. Suppose that there is a resource 546 stock, m, that in the absence of consumption or harvest pressure grows logistically, and is 547 diminished through harvesting or consumption that is associated with the strategies in a 548 game. For a 2-strategy game, let e L and e H be the harvest effort of strategies L and H, 549 respectively, where we assume, that e L < e H . The dynamics of m are governed by
where x is the fraction of the population playing strategy L, r is the intrinsic rate of growth, k 551 is the carrying capacity of m, and q is a parameter that maps resource degradation pressures 552 (or harvesting efforts) (e L , e H ) onto the rate of reduction in the resource. We assume that 553 environmental impact rates are restricted so that m will be positive at equilibrium. This
554
implies that e H ∈ [0, r/q) and e L ∈ [0, e H ).
555
Let n ∈ [0, 1] be a normalized measure of the state of the environment that maps onto 556 the payoff structure of the game. We relate m to n with the linear relationship
so that when the whole population chooses strategy L, corresponding to harvesting pressure 558 e L , the equilibrium value of m maps to the environmental metric n = 1. Similarly, if the 559 whole population adheres to strategy H, with e H environmental pressure, n → 0.
560
Next, suppose that the state of the environment influences the payoffs of the game. We 561 use a payoff matrix for a 2-strategy game with payoffs that are dependent on the normalized 562 environmental measure, n, given by
so that the matrix entries correspond to the payoffs of the game under conditions of a poor 564 or rich environmental state. We can write the payoff for playing strategy L and strategy H
Following the replicator equation, the payoffs from the game determine the evolution of the 567 fractions of the population that play each strategy. In all, we can write our system as
We let τ = t/ and re-scale time so that our system can be written as
where dx dτ = x . 570 S1. at (x * , n * ) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)} and up to two interior equilibria that occur when π L (x, n) = 573 π H (x, n) and n = x. While there are up to two points that meet the criterion for a potential 574 interior equilibrium, they need not fall inside the state space. Also, note that while n = 0 575 at n = e H −r/q e H −e L this too falls outside of our state space since we assume that e H ∈ (0, r/q) and 576 e L ∈ (0, e H ). Next, we analyze the conditions for stability of interior equilibria. The interior equilib-580 rium, defined by π L (x, n) = π H (x, n) and x = n occurs when
and x = n. We can substitute and solve for the equilibrium level of the environmental indicator and the equilibrium strategy fraction, which is
(S8) The analysis can be streamlined by defining four values as
where the ∆'s correspond to the incentive to switch to the high impact strategy and the δ's 585 correspond to the incentive to switch to the low impact strategy. The superscripts correspond 586 to the environmental state and the subscripts denote the resident strategy in the population.
587
Using these δ's and ∆'s allows us to write the interior equilibrium location as
.
(S10)
Local stability at such an equilibrium can be computed from the Jacobian matrix evaluated 589 at an interior equilibrium, which is
where g(x, n) = π L (x, n) − π H (x, n). Stability requires Det(J * ) > 0 and Tr(J * ) < 0.
591
First, consider the determinant of the Jacobian matrix,
Due to the restrictions on the level of environmental impact, e H ∈ (0, r/q) and e L ∈ [0, e H ), 593 and the fact that both x and n are between zero and one, we can conclude that Det(J * ) > 0 594 if and only if ∂g ∂n (x * , n * ) + ∂g ∂x (x * , n * ) < 0. The terms of interest are
Recalling the at an interior equilibrium x * = n * we can simplify the expression for a positive 596 determinant of the Jacobian matrix to
Evaluation at the equilibria yields the condition for a positive determinant, and is
The trace of the Jacobian matrix is
where g(x, n) = π L (x, n) − π H (x, n). Given Det(J * ) > 0, stability at an interior equilibrium 602 will occur if and only if Tr(J * ) < 0. A sufficient condition for a negative trace is ∂g ∂x (x * , n * ) < 603 0, because this implies that both terms of the trace are negative. This occurs when either
On the other hand if conditions S17 and S18 are violated, stability is still possible but not 606 assured. In this scenario, stability depends on the relative speed of environmental feedbacks.
In this case, stability occurs at the interior equilibrium when
where is the speed of environmental feedbacks relative to strategy updating. As r increases, 609 the region of the parameter space that leads to a stable interior equilibrium increases. This 610 makes sense, both and r increase the speed of environmental dynamics, and thus changes 611 in these parameters have similar effects on outcomes. 612 S1.2 Renewable resource system-level analysis 613 The x * + equilibrium is an element of the unit interval when the following conditions hold:
27
Similarly, the x * − equilibrium is an element of the unit interval when the following conditions 615 hold:
Ascertaining what these criteria mean for system-level properties of interest is simplified 617 by considering four cases that span the values of ∆ 1 L and δ 0 H . 
conditions are violated, then stability will governed by the condition on . When the interior 628 equilibrium is stable, we find no evidence limit cycles and expect all initial conditions to 629 lead to the interior equilibrium. When it is unstable, limit cycles will result from all starting 630 conditions. These are the cases that correspond to the 'oscillating tragedy of the commons'
631
in Weitz et al. (2016) .
632
Case 3: (∆ 1 L < 0 and δ 0 H > 0) In this case, both interior equilibria can fall within the 633 state space, given all the following hold:
28
For these four conditions to hold, given ∆ 1 
Also, since violating the first condition implies that interior equilibria cannot exist, there 640 will either be two or zero interior equilibria (with a special case where the nullclines are 641 tangent at one point). When there is no interior equilibrium, dynamics will tend toward the 642 state where all individuals employ the strategy with low environmental impact. This state 643 is stable, since ∆ 1 L < 0. When there are two interior equilibria, one will be a saddle, and one 644 will be stable or unstable depending on parameters and the degree of timescale separation.
645
If this interior equilibrium is stable, then the resulting dynamics of the system will be similar 646 to the bi-stable regime described above. If this interior equilibrium is unstable, the system 647 may have limit cycles from some initial conditions and tend toward dominance of the low 648 impact strategy from other initial conditions. It is also possible, for low values of , that a 649 limit cycle will not exist, and instead dynamics will tent toward the low impact state from 650 all initial conditions.
651
Case 4: (∆ 1 L > 0 and δ 0 H < 0) Lastly, following similar arguments as in case 3, we 652 conclude that two interior equilibria will result when ∆ 1 and are maintained by production as a consequence of agents' strategies. Here, we treat this 661 case.
662
Let m be the concentration a resource that impacts the payoffs of players in a game, and 663 is created as a byproduct playing the game. We assume that in the absence of production 664 by players of the game, the concentration of m decays exponentially. We also assume that 665 strategy L has a low emissions rate of the resource, e L , and strategy H has a higher emissions 666 29 rate rate, e H . Given these assumptions we can model the dynamics of m as
where x is the fraction of the population that employs strategy L, and (1 − x) is the fraction 668 of strategy H players. While m can be any resource that meets the assumptions above, 669 a clear example with societal relevance is pollution. Many actions generate pollution, and 670 stocks of pollution impact many systems. However, there is a more broad class of problems 671 that also fit within this framework, including the cognition-environment feedbacks studied 672 by Rand et al. (2017) .
673
As in the case of the regenerating resource studied in the previous section, we define a 674 metric of the environmental state, n,
such that when the whole population has high emissions, e H , n → 0 and when the whole 676 population has low emissions, e L , n → 1. Whereas m is a direct measure of the concentration 677 of a resource stock, for example a pollutant, n is a normalized transformation of m that is 678 used to write the payoff structure of the game being considered. Employing a change of 679 variables, the dynamics of n can be modeled as
We use the same payoff matrix as before for the 2-strategy game with payoffs that are 681 dependent on the normalized environmental measure, n, given by 682
so that the matrix entries correspond to the payoffs of the game under conditions of a poor 683 or rich environmental state. We can write the payoff for playing strategy L and strategy H 684
when x is the fraction of the population that plays strategy L and has low emissions. Fol-686 lowing the replicator equation, the payoffs from the game determine the evolution of the 687 30 proportion of the population that plays each strategy. In all, we can write our system as
Let τ = t/ to re-scale time so that our system can be written as
where dx dτ = x .
690
S2.1 Decaying resource stability analysis 691
This model also has up to four equilibria within the state space. We have 2 edge equilibria,
692
at (x * , n * ) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)} and up to two interior equilibria that occur when π L (x, n) = 693 π H (x, n) and n = x. 694 We analyze the Jacobian matrix to derive the conditions for stability of interior equilibria.
695
The Jacobian matrix for this system at an interior equilibrium is
where, once again, g(x, n) = π L (x, n)−π H (x, n). Also, the location of the interior equilibrium 697 is the same as in the renewable resource model, with
to simplify our expressions and take into account only the differences in the payoffs, without loss of generality. The simplified expression for the interior equilibrium is
(S33)
In relation to the analyses for the renewable resource model, the structure of the Jacobian 702 matrix for the decaying resource model is very similar. This will make our analysis easier 703 because much of it carries over directly from previous sections.
704
Stability at an interior equilibrium can be determined by trace and determinant of the 
However, if condition S35 is violated but condition S34 holds, stability is still possible, and 708 will depend on the speed of environmental feedbacks. In this case, the condition for stability
so that fast enough environmental dynamics can stabilize any interior equilibrium, even if 711 condition S35 is not met. Lastly, g(x, n) is unchanged from the renewable resource model,
712
implying that the forms of condition S35 and condition S34 also remain unchanged from the 713 renewable resource model.
714
Now, we consider the edge equilibria. As before, at (x * , n * ) = (0, 0) stability occurs if and We alluded the the existence of limit cycles in some regions of the parameter space, and 728 suggested that limit cycles do not occur in other regions of the paratmeter space. A challenge 729 to making such claims arises because local stability analyses are not sufficient to describe 730 global dynamics. In this section we detial the analysis on the existence, (or non-existence) 731 of limit cycles in our framework. We break this analysis down into cases, following our local 732 stability analysis.
733
Case 1: (∆ 1 L < 0 and δ 0 H < 0) We showed that in this case the only interior equilibrium 734 point is a saddle. In two dimensional systems, a limit cycle must contain at least one 735 equilibrium point. However, in this region, the interior equilibrium is a saddle point, which 736 cannot be the only equilibrium point within a limit cycle in a two dimensional system.
737
Therefore, we can conclude that this region of parameter space cannot contain limit cycles. 
We are interested in the region of the state space for which limit cycles can be ruled out for 762 any value of . Notice that the term − α x(1−x) is always negative, but becomes close to zero 763 for small and x near 1/2. Therefore, limit cycles can be ruled out when ∂g ∂x < 0 for all x, n 764 in the state space. Thus we can rule out cycles for any when δ 0 H > δ 0 L and ∆ 1 L > ∆ 1 H . We 765 can also rule out cycles when
holds. This proof of the non-existence of limit cycles shows that limit cycles cannot occur for 767 fast environmental feedbacks. Further, a graphical argument shows that limit cycles cannot 768 occur for slow environmental feedbacks either (given ∆ 1 L δ 0 H > δ 0 L ∆ 1 H , the fast sub-system is 769 attracting and slow dynamics along the strategy nullcline lead to the equilibirum). Further, 770 when ∆ 1 L δ 0 H > δ 0 L ∆ 1 H holds, then we know that the interior equilibrium will be locally stable 771 for all , which implies that if limit cycles were to arise in this region it would have to 772 be a pair of unstable and stable limit cycles. In extensive simulations we find no evidence 773 of such dynamics. For the renewable resource framework, the same analysis holds, given 774 e L > 2e H − r/q.
775
Case 3: (∆ 1 L < 0 and δ 0 H > 0) In this case there are either zero or two interior equilibria.
776
In the cases where no interior equilibria are present, limit-cycles cannot occur, since a limit 777 cycle must contain an equilibrium. In the region of the parameter space where there are 778 two interior equilibria, one is always a saddle and the other is stable or unstable. The same 779 analysis as above, in consultation with figure 2 shows that limit cycles cannot occur in this 780 regime for ∆ 1 H < ∆ 1 L . Further, any limit cycle that does exist will not contain the saddle 781 equilibrium. While this is a proof of the non-existence of limit cycles for only a subset of the 782 green region in figure 2, we again find no evidence of limit cycles in the green region of the 783 parameter space.
784
Case 4: (∆ 1 L > 0 and δ 0 H < 0) Lastly, following similar arguments as in case 3, we paper is a special case of our decaying resource framework of game-environment feedbacks.
794
In this section, we make the connection explicit.
795
First, we introduce the model from Rand et al. (2017) . Let x be the fraction of controlled 796 processing agents in the population. Then the fitness of each agent is
where c is the fixed cost of controlled processing, w is the extra cost of being a controlled 798 processing agent when rare, and p is the environmentally dependent cost of automatic pro-799 cessing. This cost is governed by a "cognition-environment" feedback given by
where τ p governs the relative speed of this feedback. The dynamics of the frequency of the 801 agents is governed by the replicator equation:
This leads a complete system of equations given by
Recall that the general decaying-resource model presented herein is given by
where y is the fraction of the population with strategy L, n is a measure of the resource 805 stock and π L (y, n) and π H (y, n) are the environmentally dependent payoffs from the game
If we transform the equations from Rand et al. (2017) by
we can write the dynamics of the new system as 809ẏ = −ẋ(x = 1 − y, p = n) (S46a) n =ṗ(x = 1 − y, p = n)
which simplifies to
Thus, if we let α = 1/τ p , R 0 = 1, S 0 = 1, T 0 = 1 − c − w, P 0 = 1 − c, R 1 = 0, S 1 = 0,
811
T 1 = 1−c−w, and P 1 = 1−c we can see that our general model from system of equations S43 analyzed in this paper. Given this, we could typically compute the δ's and from this know 815 the location, stability and dynamics near the equilibria of the system. However, this model is a 'special' special case, thus more analysis is needed to go from the general model to the results of Rand et al. (2017) .
818
The δ values that govern the analysis are
these values for the δ and ∆ parameters fall within the special case where
This is a special case that we have yet to analyze for the general model, because it accounts 821 for a small region of the parameter space. We proceed to analyze the general model given 
where y is the fraction of the population with strategy L, n is a measure of the resource 829 stock and 830 g(y, n) = π L (y, n) − π H (y, n)
is the gradient of selection. The interior equilibrium occurs where g(y, n) = 0 and y = n.
831
The first condition holds when
37
In this special case, the denominator is equal to A = δ 0 H + ∆ 1 H = δ 0 L + ∆ 1 L . This simplifies 833 our analysis and we can write the location of the interior equilibrium as
Stability at this interior equilibrium can be derived from the Jacobian matrix evaluated at 836 this equilibrium,
An unstable interior equilibrium will occur when Det(J * ) > 0 and Tr(J * ) > 0, and this will 840 lead to cycles. Det(J * ) > 0 if and only if (δ 0
which in this special case is equal to
by the definition of A. Tr(J * ) > 0 if and only if α <
this special case is equal to
Now That the analysis has been done for the general case under the assumption that ∆ 1 
The first condition is satisfied by the assumption needed for the existence of an interior 852 equilibrium, w + c < 1 and the assumption that c ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0. Notice that when w = 0, 853 there does not exist a τ p for which the interior equilibrium is unstable. This can be seen 854 directly from a necessary condition for cycles, violating equation S18 which requires w > 0 855 (this is from the renewable resource case, but an identical necessary condition exists in the 856 decaying resource case).
857
S5 Common-pool resource harvesting 858 Here, we consider a classic model of common-pool resource harvesting. We assume that 859 individuals either harvest with high, e H , or low, e L , effort. We let the evolutionary process 860 be governed by a profit function, π(e i , η), that maps the resource level and harvest effort 861 into fitness. As before, we assume that the resource, η is governed by logistic growth, and 862 the harvest rate is proportional to η and effort. We can write our system as
where x is the fraction of the population that harvests with low effort, k is the carrying 864 capacity of the resource, q is the efficiency with which effort is transformed into harvest, and 865 controls the relative timescales of strategy and resource dynamics. For small , strategy 866 dynamics are fast relative to resource dynamics.
867
Now, we turn our attention the the profit function, π(e i , η). In this simplest case, revenue will depend on the harvest and the price at which the harvested resource can be sold, and costs will increase linearly in effort. Under these assumptions, we can write the profit of an 870 individual as
where p is the fixed price of the resource and w is the marginal cost of effort.
872
This gives us a complete description of our system, however, it is not immediately obvious 873 that this model is a special case of the renewable resource case studied in detail above.
874
Employing this profit function, we can simply express our system of equations as
Throughout this analysis, We assume that e L < e H . Now, in order to make an exact 876 mapping between this model and the general renewable resource model analyzed in section 2.1 877 we linearly transform the resource level, η, into an environmental metric, n that is bounded 878 between 0 and 1. Within this transformed space, we can construct a payoff matrix, Π(n) 879 that maps onto our common-pool resource harvesting case.
880
First, we define our environmental metric as
and write the state of our resulting system in terms of x and n. We have
From this we can reconstruct a payoff matrix Π(n) that leads to this system equations. The 883 entries of Π(n) are
Thus, we can write the values of δ as
Depending on the parameter values chosen we have three possible outcomes. First, when 886 positive profits occur at the low effort dominated environmental equilibrium but negative 887 profits result at the high impact dominated equilibrium then we have ∆ 1 L = ∆ 1 H > 0 and
This implies that the system always falls at the boundary of the region where 889 cycles are possible in Figure 2b . This implies that while cycles cannot occur in this system, so that there is a price ceiling of p 0 and a linear decrease with slope γ as supply increases.
915
With this formulation, we can write the profit of low and high effort harvesters as
In total, the model can be written as 
so that there are two branches of the relationship depending on whether the square root is added or subtracted from the relationship. This can be simplified to n = 2w
which, since e H > e L , illustrates that as x increases, the second term in the denominator 936 also increases. This implies that on the upper branch of the nullcline is increasing in x 937 and the lower branch of the nullcline is decreasing in x for all x ∈ [0, 1], given that p 0 > 938 4γw(e H (1 − x) + e L x). This will simplify stability analyses at interior equilibria.
939
Now we characterize the stability of the equilibria of the system. First, we will consider 940 the interior equilibria. at the lower branch of the strategy nullcline. We know that the environment nullcline is 946 increasing in x because e L < e H , and thatṅ > 0 below the nullcline. Further, from the form 947 of the strategy nullcline, we know that the lower branch is decreasing in x and thatẋ > 0 948 below the nullcline. From this we can determine the sign of each element of the Jacobian 949 matrix. In this case we have
for the signs of the Jacobian, which implies stability.
951
Along the upper branch of the nullcline, the stability analysis is slightly more complex.
952
Consider the path derivatives along theẋ = 0 andṅ = 0 nullclines. Let S x and S n denote the slopes of the strategy and environment nullclines at equilibirum, respectively. Using these identities, we can rewrite our Jacobian as
since S n is positive andṅ > 0 below the environment nullcline then ∂ṅ ∂n (x * , n * ) < 0. Also, since S x is positive andẋ > 0 above the upper branch of the strategy nullcline, then we can 960 conclude that ∂ẋ ∂n (x * , n * ) > 0. In total, this implies that Tr(J) < 0 and 961
We can conclude that the interior equilibrium at an intersection of the upper branch of the 962 strategy nullcline with the environment nullcline will be stable if and only if S x > S n . If 963 the slope of the environment nullcline is greater than the strategy nullcline, then the interior 964 equilibrium at this point will be a saddle. Note that never does the stability of an interior 965 equilibrium depend on the relative timescale of resource and strategy dynamics, .
966
Edge equilibria Here, we analyze the stability of the equilibria at the edge of the phase 967 space. These analyses are simplest graphically. Given that e L < e H and e L is low enough 968 that it will not drive the environment to zero, then both equilibria at n = 0 will be unstable.
969
The equilibrium at x = 0 and n > 0 is stable if and only if it's location falls above the 970 lower branch of the strategy nullcline, but below the upper branch of the strategy nullcline.
971
Conversely, the equilibrium at x = 0 and n > 0 is stable if and only if its location falls below 972 the lower, or above the upper branch of the strategy nullcline. parameter S1(a) S1(b) S2(a) S2(b) S2(c) S2 (d) 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 γ 0-3 0-3 0.1 1.3 2.5 2.9 0.28 3.2 0.28 0.001 Table 1 : Parameter values used to create each phase plane shown in Figure S1 and Figure S2 , from top-left (a) to bottom-right (h) state of and location of the resource. This could lead to increasing harvest efficiency, q, as a Figure S3 : Phase plane and temporal dynamics of common-pool resource harvesting with frequency-dependent harvesting efficiency. The dynamics show convergence to a stable limit cycle. (r = 0.33, K = 4, q = 0.5, e L = 0.33, e H = 0.6, p = 10, w = 5, = 1.3, α L = 0.22, α H = 0.05)
With these modifications, our system can be written as 1008
x = x(1 − x) (pnq 0 (e L (1 + α L x) − e H (1 + α H (1 − x))) − w(e L − e H )) (S71a) n = rn 1 − n k − q 0 n (e L x(1 + α L x) + e H (1 − x)(1 + α H (1 − x))) ,
given that time has been re-scaled.
1009
To analyze this system we consider the nullclines. The sets of points where n = 0 are 1010 n = 0 and 1011 n = k 1 − q 0 r (e L x(1 + α L x) + e H (1 − x)(1 + α H (1 − x))) .
The sets of points where x = 0 are x = 0, x = 1 and .
Since e H > e L we know that the strategy nullcline is increasing in x when the strategy 1013 nullcline lies within the state space, n > 0. Further, the resource nullcline is quadratic in x 1014 and opens downward. We are in particular interested in the stability of interior equilibria. .
Stability at the equilibrium can be determined from the trace and determinant of J. We 
The structure of our system guarantees that ∂n ∂n and ∂x ∂n will be negative at equilibrium.
1022
Therefore, S n > S x is necessary, but not sufficient for stability. If S x > S n the interior 1023 equilibrium will be a saddle. Given that S n > S x , then stability will occur when when the 1024 trace of J is negative. Due to our separation of timescales, we have a term, , that controls 1025 the relative speed of resource dynamics. We have 1026 Tr(J) = ∂n ∂n + ∂x ∂x (S75) with ∂n ∂n < 0 and ∂x ∂x > 0. Since the first term contains , we know that the trace will
